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I. INTRODUCTION
In their first-year civil procedure class, law students learn that a
federal statute grants federal district courts jurisdiction over cases "arising
under" federal law.' Yet, section 1331 is not nearly as encompassing-or
as potent-in its grant of federal question jurisdiction to federal courts as
its language suggests. 2 The law governing the extent to which Congress
must act before federal courts will decide that Congress intended to grant
jurisdiction to federal courts over particular cases is far from well-settled.
The unique provision for jurisdiction over private claims brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA)3 put this amorphous
body of law, with its equally amorphous application by individual courts,
to the test.
The TCPA is a federal statute enacted to "protect the privacy interests
of residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited,
automated telephone calls to the home" and to "facilitate interstate
commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimile [fax] machines and
automatic dialers."4 The statute accomplishes this end by prohibiting
certain unsolicited phone calls and calls using an automated or prerecorded
voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the party
receiving the call. 5 In addition, the statute prohibits the sending of
unsolicited advertisements to telephone fax machines.6
These provisions may be enforced by either of two mechanisms. First,
private citizens may bring a private action to enjoin a violation of the Act
and to recover damages. These damages may either be actual damages or
$500 per violation, whichever is greater.7 Second, the Attorney Generals of
the various states are authorized to bring a civil action on behalf of their
residents who have been subjected to violations of the Act.8
The key portion of the Act, for the purposes of this Note, is the clause
in the statute that provides jurisdiction over the private actions brought to
enforce the TCPA.9 This portion of the statute provides that "[a] person or
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a [s]tate,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
2. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,495 (1983).
3. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2364 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994)).
4. S. RP. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968.
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (1994).
6. See id. § 227(b)(1)(C).
7. See id. § 227(b)(3)(A), (B).
8. See id. § 227(f)(1).
9. See id. § 227(b)(3).
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bring in an appropriate court of that [s]tate" an action to enforce the
statute.10 Two aspects of this provision are noteworthy. First, for a court of
any particular state to have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims, the
legislature of that state must have authorized its courts to exercise
jurisdiction. Congress inserted this provision into the statute to eliminate
the potential problems caused if Congress effectively ordered state courts,
and only state courts, to enforce federal statutes." The second aspect of this
provision consumes the remainder of this Note. While the statute expressly
provides for jurisdiction by those state courts whose legislatures allow
them to hear TCPA cases, the statute is silent regarding federal district
court jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
Whether the federal district courts have jurisdiction over private
TCPA claims remains an open question. Since the TCPA's enactment in
1991, five federal courts of appeals have concluded that the district courts
do not have jurisdiction over these claims. 2 One district court concluded
that federal district courts do have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. 3
In the final analysis, the courts of appeals are correct. Congress did
not grant jurisdiction over private TCPA claims to the federal district
courts. However, these courts overlooked important justifications for this
result. These courts failed to consider the possibility that defendants would
remove TCPA cases to the federal courts if federal jurisdiction was
permitted. The removal of these cases is contrary to the public policy found
in the legislative history of the TCPA. Coupled with the uniqueness of
language granting jurisdiction of private TCPA claims in the statute, the
arguments posited by the courts in opposition to federal jurisdiction over
TCPA claims are more than sufficient to refute the claim that federal
district courts have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of federal question
jurisdiction and the jurisdictional issue raised by the unique language of the
TCPA. Part Il discusses the approach that the federal circuit courts have
taken in resolving the question of whether federal district courts have
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. Part IV discusses the criticisms of
the federal circuit courts' approach and why these are unfounded. Part V
10. Id.
11. See 137 CONG. REC. S30,821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
12. See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Serv., Ltd.,
156 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.
1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (1lth Cir. 1998); International
Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Comm., Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); Chair
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997).
13. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995), recons.
denied, 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
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discusses and applies the correct approach to federal jurisdiction questions
in the TCPA. Part VI demonstrates that a proper consideration of the
possibility of removing TCPA cases to federal court requires that state
courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE TCPA
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 14 The limits of federal
jurisdiction find their origins in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 5
Article III specifically limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
enumerated circumstances. The genesis of federal question jurisdiction
lies in Article ll's grant of power to the federal courts to hear cases
"arising under" federal law.' 7 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
however, Article 11I's grant of power is "not self-executing."'" With the
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875,'9 Congress granted the federal courts
general federal question jurisdiction.
The question then becomes: to what extent must Congress act to grant
jurisdiction to federal courts over cases arising under a particular federal
statute? Of course, this is primarily a determination of whether Congress
intended to grant federal district courts jurisdiction over cases arising under
a particular statute.20 The law responding to this question, however, is not
well-settled. The approaches that courts and the scholarship in this area
have taken in resolving this issue fall into two camps, as the case law
illustrates, depending upon the significance attached to section 1331. The
first approach, exemplified by Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.,2' reads
section 1331 very broadly. Under this view, section 1331 grants federal
district courts the power to hear all cases in which federal law creates the
14. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,449 (1850).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III.
16. These situations include cases "arising under this Constitution, the [l]aws of the
United States, and [t]reaties made ... under their [a]uthority," cases affecting ambassadors
and other official representatives of foreign sovereigns, admiralty and maritime cases,
controversies to which the United States is a party, cases between different states or a state
and a citizen of a different state, cases between citizens of different states, and cases
between citizens or states in this country and foreign states or citizens. U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2.
17. See id.
18. Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
20. See International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Comm., Inc., 106 F.3d 1146,
1151 (4th Cir. 1997).
21. 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
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cause of action, even if the statute in question is silent regarding the issue
of federal jurisdiction.22 In this way, courts using the Kenro approach read
section 1331 as creating a refutable presumption in favor of the existence
of federal question jurisdiction for every cause of action created by federal
law. As a result, under this approach, the only way that a court may
properly conclude that Congress did not intend to give federal courts
jurisdiction over cases arising under a federal statute is to discover a
contrary intent on the part of Congress---either via express prohibition of
federal jurisdiction in the language of the statute or the legislative history.
The second approach, exemplified by International Science &
Technology Institute, Inc. v. nacom Communication, Inc.,2 views section
1331 as insufficient to provide the sole basis for conferring jurisdiction to
district courts over cases brought to enforce a statute that expressly confers
jurisdiction to courts other than district courts. 24 Courts subscribing to this
approach rely on Supreme Court precedents that have interpreted the
phrase "arising under" in section 1331 more narrowly than its
constitutional counterpart in Article IEI. 25 These courts interpret section
1331 to be sufficiently narrow as to require an additional signal from
Congress to give rise to the conclusion that Congress intended to grant
26federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. The
International Science & Technology Institute approach takes the view that
section 1331 creates a much weaker presumption of federal jurisdiction
over these cases than does the Kenro approach. 27 These different views of
the role that section 1331 plays in expressing the intent of Congress to
confer federal jurisdiction account for the different conclusions reached
concerning whether Congress intended to grant federal courts jurisdiction
over cases brought under the TCPA.
B. Jurisdictional Possibilities and the Novelty of the TCPA
Federalism creates interesting jurisdictional conundrums for cases
founded upon federal law due to the potential availability of both state and
22. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D. Ind. 1995), recons.
denied, 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
23. 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
24. See id. at 1155.
25. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
26. See International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc., 106 F.3d at 1153-54.
27. Later in International Science & Technology Institute, the court somewhat abandons
this view, but only after it is well on its way to concluding that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over private actions brought to enforce the TCPA. See id. at 1154. Other courts,
including the progeny of International Science & Technology Institute, maintain this
approach. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1998).
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federal courts. 28 Depending upon the language of the particular statute
under which the cause of action is brought, the cause of action may
encounter three possible jurisdictional scenarios. The first and most
prevalent situation is referred to as concurrent jurisdiction.29 A statute
granting concurrent jurisdiction allows both state courts and federal district
courts to hear cases brought to enforce rights created by federal law. 3° In
fact, Supreme Court precedents have effectively created a presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction, unless "excluded by express provision, or by
incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular
case."
3 1
The second jurisdictional scenario includes only those statutes
providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction. As the name suggests, only
federal district courts are permitted to hear cases brought under these
statutes. As the Supreme Court noted in Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney,33 "exclusive federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal law has been the exception rather than the rule," due in part to the
effective presumption of concurrent jurisdiction discussed above.34 Even
so, the vast majority of federal statutes provide for either concurrent
jurisdiction or exclusive federal jurisdiction.35
The last possible scenario occurs when federal law grants jurisdiction
exclusively to state courts. As the Third Circuit noted, this situation is
"unique. ' '36 As a result, the federal courts are unaccustomed to the task of
interpreting statutes with language suggesting that state courts alone are
empowered to hear cases arising under federal law. This becomes obvious
after a thorough examination of International Science & Technology
37Institute and its progeny.
28. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962) (stating that
"nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights
created by federal law").
29. See id.
30. Seeid. at513.
31. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
32. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE §
23, at 101 (2d ed. 1994).
33. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
34. Id. at 507-08.
35. See ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 515 (3d Cir. 1998).
36. Id. at 515.
37. The cases following International Science & Technology Institute include Foxhall
Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Service, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432 (2d
Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998); Nicholson v.
Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston
Cellular, Inc., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997).
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I[. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CouRTS' APPROACH
In International Science & Technology Institute, the Fourth Circuit
wrote the first circuit court opinion to address the question of whether the
TCPA divested federal district courts of jurisdiction over private TCPA
claims. In the interim, four other circuit courts have addressed the issue."
All of the subsequent cases rely to differing degrees on International
Science & Technology Institute for one proposition or another, yet each one
explains its supporting arguments in its own way. To avoid unnecessary
confusion, the following analysis discusses what the Author considers to be
the best version of each argument from among the five cases, rather than
choosing one case and discussing all of the arguments posited therein, or
attempting to discuss each version of each argument presented in the five
cases.
The Third Circuit's decision in ErieNet does the most complete job of
explaining the relationship of section 1331 to the language in individual
statutes conferring jurisdiction to courts other than federal district courts.
The court begins by noting that section 1331 does not grant federal district
courts the power to hear all cases created by federal law.39 Instead, section
1331 functions as a general grant of jurisdiction to district courts over cases
brought to enforce federal law, and does not trump other statutes and
doctrines of judicial administration that preclude federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over particular cases. 40 Accordingly, the court cited
case law requiring plaintiffs to show "first that their action . . . 'arises
under' . . . [federal law] and second that section 1331 jurisdiction is not
preempted by a more specific statutory provision conferring exclusive
jurisdiction elsewhere." 41 The court then concluded that the language of the
TCPA providing for state court jurisdiction is a statutory provision
conferring exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere. 42 The court noted two
examples of federal statutes that specifically assign jurisdiction over
particular cases to other federal courts43 and concluded that Congress's
specific reference to a particular court "negates district court jurisdiction
38. See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc., 156 F.3d 432; ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d 513;
Nicholson, 136 F.3d 1287; Chair King, Inc., 131 F.3d 507.
39. See ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 518.
40. See id. (citing First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979)).
41. Id. (quoting Connors v. Amax Coal Co., 858 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (7th Cir. 1998)).
42. See id. at 519.
43. See id. These statutes include 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994) (assigning to the Court
of Federal Claims jurisdiction over certain takings claims) and 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994)
(assigning original jurisdiction to the federal circuit courts to review agency orders under the
National Labor Relations Act).
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under [section] 1331."" The court based this conclusion on its observation
that the federal courts have never required Congress to expressly exclude
district court jurisdiction or to grant jurisdiction only to expressly
mentioned courts.45 Thus, the Third Circuit views the divestment of federal
district court jurisdiction not as a repeal of section 1331, but as a
preemption of section 1331. Because Congress may preempt section 1331
via the express mention of another court without expressly excluding
federal district courts, Congress must have intended to provide only for
state court jurisdiction in the TCPA.46
While the previous discussion of section 1331 jurisdiction concerns
the backbone of the circuit courts' approach to the jurisdiction provision in
the TCPA, the other courts cite two other significant reasons for their
conclusions that the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over
private TCPA actions. The first reason concerns the specificity of the
language providing for jurisdiction over claims in the remainder of the
TCPA, as well as in the entire Communications Act of 1934.47 In other
provisions of the TCPA, Congress expressly provided for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over claims brought by state Attorney Generals on behalf of
residents of their states.48 The court in International Science & Technology
Institute used this precise language providing for exclusive federal
jurisdiction in the remainder of the statute to conclude that Congress would
have expressly provided for federal jurisdiction had it intended to grant
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims to district courts.49 Similarly, the
court noted other instances in the remainder of the Communications Act in
which Congress explicitly provided for concurrent jurisdiction.0 Because
the statute expressly mentioned only state court jurisdiction over private
claims brought under the TCPA, the court reasoned that Congress must not
have intended to give federal courts jurisdiction over private TCPA
claims. 51
44. Id.
45. See id. (citing Public Util. Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 627
(9th Cir. 1985)).
46. See id.
47. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
48. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(2) (1994).
49. See International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Comm., Inc., 106 F.3d 1146,
1152 (4th Cir. 1997).
50. See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(c), 407, 415(f) (1994)).
51. One critic of the result in International Science & Technology Institute has
disapprovingly noted this approach to statutory construction. See ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity
Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 1998) (Alito, J., dissenting). However, one member of
the current Supreme Court applauded this approach when used by the Court. See Patterson
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The other major reason cited for the courts' conclusions that the
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims concerns
the legislative history of the statute. The circuit courts, following the lead
of International Science & Technology Institute, all cite essentially the
same section of the legislative history. The Fourth Circuit quotes a
statement made by Senator Hollings, the bill's sponsor:
The bill does not, because of constitutional restraints, dictate to the
States which court in each [s]tate shall be the proper venue for such an
action, as this is a matter for [s]tate legislators to determine.
Nevertheless, it is my hope that [s]tates will make it as easy as possible
for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims courts.
Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to
appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of damages in
this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the
telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the
attorneys' costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater than
the potential damages.52
The court then concluded that the "clear thrust of [Senator Hollings']
statement was consistent with the bill's text that state courts were the
intended fora for private TCPA actions," despite the fact that the legislative
history did not expressly reveal state court jurisdiction as the only
appropriate jurisdiction.
The circuit courts' approach to the jurisdiction question in the TCPA
may be summarized as follows. In the views of these courts, section 1331
does not grant district courts the authority to hear all cases brought to
enforce federal law. Instead, section 1331 may be preempted by another
statute or doctrine that requires jurisdiction to reside elsewhere. In addition,
Congress referred explicitly to federal courts in other sections of the TCPA
and Communications Act when it intended to grant jurisdiction to federal
courts. The absence of any mention of federal courts in section 227(b)(3)
thus signifies an intent to preclude federal court jurisdiction. Finally, the
legislative history supports the view that Congress intended for state courts
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. All of these
considerations support these courts' contentions that federal courts do not
have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. 137 CONG. REC. S30,821-22 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings); see also
International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc., 106 F.3d at 1152-53.
53. International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc., 106 F.3d at 1153.
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IV. CRITICISMS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS' APPROACH
A. Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.
The only published opinion to hold that federal district courts have
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims is Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.5
Kenro is the only TCPA opinion that explicitly incorporates a
consideration of section 1441 removal doctrine into its analysis.
Unfortunately, even though the Kenro court appropriately considered the
impact of the removal doctrine, its consideration of the removal doctrine
led to an improper result.
The court's conclusion in Kenro rests on the presumption in favor of
federal jurisdiction in the absence of an express statutory provision to the
contrary. The court read section 1331 broadly to confer federal question
jurisdiction over claims brought to enforce federal law.5 Because the
TCPA is a federal law and provides for a private cause of action, the court
56
concluded that federal district courts have jurisdiction over TCPA claims. 5
The court disposed of the possibility that Congress intended to confer
exclusive jurisdiction on state courts by stating that "had Congress
intended to supercede the federal question jurisdiction provided by
[section] 1331 .... it could and would have done so with clear language to
that effect. ' 57 Because there is no explicit statutory preclusion of federal
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims, the Kenro court concluded that
district courts may exercise jurisdiction.
The Kenro court justified its approach-that federal jurisdiction is
presumed over cases arising under federal law absent an express
prohibition to the contrary-not only by reading section 1331 broadly, but
also by making an analogy to section 1441 removal doctrine. The court
cited a Seventh Circuit holding that a statute's express provision for a
particular venue to which a case may be removed did not prohibit the
defendant from removing cases to other district courts. 5' Relying on the
same principle as the Seventh Circuit-that "repeals by implication are not
54. 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995), recons. denied, 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind.
1997).
55. See id. at 913. The court's analysis for the question of remand to remedy an invalid
removal begins with whether plaintiff's complaint states a claim "cognizable under federal
law," thus apparently satisfying section 1331, in the court's view. Id.
56. See id. at 914.
57. Kenro, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1164. This opinion, on reconsideration, effectively
responded to International Science & Technology Institute.
58. See Kenro, Inc., 904 F. Supp. at 914 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot,
938 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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favored" 59 --the Kenro court refused to assume that section 227(b)(3) was
meant to repeal the federal question jurisdiction granted by section 1331 6
0
The most serious flaw in the Kenro analysis is its failure to
distinguish the precedents suggesting that section 1331 grants federal
61jurisdiction unless a specific statute assigns jurisdiction elsewhere.
Further, the court fails to recognize other precedents stating that Congress
is not required to expressly prohibit district court jurisdiction when
assigning jurisdiction to another court.6 2 Instead, the Kenro court attempts
to fly in the face of strong precedent by making a weak analogy to section
1441 doctrine in which the possibility of removal is presumed unless the
particular statute sought to be enforced explicitly prohibits removal.63 Such
an analogy is unconvincing, however, when higher courts have interpreted
section 1331, resting on its own bottom, to confer jurisdiction to federal
courts only if another statute does not confer jurisdiction elsewheref 4 In
particular, the Kenro position relies on a principle-that "repeals by
implication are not favored"-extracted from a substantive area of law, not
procedural. 5 Because the Kenro court did not adequately address the
existing precedent in its decision, its position is not as convincing as that of
the other five circuit courts of appeals.
Another flaw in the Kenro opinion is its failure to include an analysis
66
of the legislative history of the TCPA. If the court had fully considered
the legislative history of the TCPA, it might have been aware of the very
real policy choices made by Congress in favor of conferring jurisdiction
only to state courts. Couple these policies with a consideration of the effect
that allowing for removal would have on the cheap and easy enforcement
59. Id. at 914-15 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442
(1987)).
60. See id. at 915.
61. See Connors v. Amax Coal Co., 858 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (7th Cir. 1988); First
Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. See Public Util. Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that "jurisdiction over a specific class of claims which Congress has
committed to the court of appeals generally is exclusive, even in the absence of an express
statutory command of exclusiveness"). For a partial list of federal statutes that have been
construed to confer jurisdiction only to courts other than district courts without expressly
prohibiting district court jurisdiction, see International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom
Comm., Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (4th Cir. 1997).
63. See Kenro, Inc., 904 F. Supp. at 914-15 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot,
938 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1991)).
64. See Connors, 858 F.2d at 1229-30; First Jersey Sec., Inc., 605 F.2d at 694.
65. Kenro, Inc., 904 F. Supp. at 914-15 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437,442 (1987)).
66. Instead, the court completely ignored the legislative history of the TCPA.
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of the TCPA,67 and the Kenro court's conclusion becomes even more
difficult to support. In short, the Kenro decision fails to adequately
consider all of the factors that would lead to the conclusion that Congress
intended to confer jurisdiction over private TCPA claims to state courts
only.
B. Scholarly Criticism
Recent scholarship 6' and dissenting opinions69 in the five circuit court
opinions concluded that the five circuit courts erred in holding that federal
district courts do not have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. These
criticisms focus not only on the courts' interpretations of the legislative
history, as discussed earlier, but also on their interpretations of section
1331.70
One critic has contended that the effect of section 1331 is to create
federal district court jurisdiction in every federal statute providing for a
• 71
private right of action. Under this approach, the only way that Congress
can divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over claims arising under
federal law is to effectively repeal section 1331 as it applies to the statute
72 73providing for the claim. Because repeals by implication are disfavored,
statutes that can be reconciled must be left to coexist.74 As a result, because
the express provision of permissive state court jurisdiction over TCPA
claims does not, in this view, conflict with federal court jurisdiction, the
TCPA and section 1331 can be reconciled. Thus, under this approach, the
TCPA does not divest the federal district courts of their jurisdiction over
private TCPA claims under section 1331.75
This view, however, necessarily rests on two flawed premises. The
first premise is that an express provision for permissive state court
jurisdiction is analogous to an express provision for permissive federal
67. This is a policy preference expressed in the legislative history of the TCPA. See
infra Part V.
68. See, e.g., Fabian D. Gonell, Note, Statutory Interpretation of Federal Jurisdictional
Statutes: Jurisdiction of the Private Right of Action Under the TCPA, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1895 (1998).
69. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 521 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
70. See Gonell, supra note 68, at 1929-30.
71. See id. at 1903.
72. See id. at 1909.
73. See id. (citing Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547 (1988); Kremer v. Chemical
Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939)).
74. See id. at 1909-10 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)).
75. See id. at 1930.
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court jurisdiction, with its associated presumption of state court jurisdiction
unless expressly prohibited. The critics came to this conclusion after
reviewing three Supreme Court cases holding that a federal statute's
provision for permissive federal court jurisdiction does not preclude state
courts from exercising jurisdiction as well.76 While assuming that
symmetry exists between federal and state court jurisdiction in this regard,
Gonell concluded from these cases that a statute's provision for permissive
state court jurisdiction does not preclude federal court jurisdiction.77
The second flawed premise of the idea that section 1331 creates
federal district court jurisdiction in every federal statute providing for a
private right of action is that section 1331 must effectively be repealed with
respect to particular statutes if the district courts are to be divested of
jurisdiction over claims arising under those statutes. 7s This repeal
framework for determining the existence of federal question jurisdiction
over particular cases is contrary to existing case law. As a result, this
conflict seriously undermines the argument that permissive state court
jurisdiction does not preclude federal court jurisdiction.
The scholarship critical of the circuit courts' approach presumes that
the Supreme Court's holdings in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,79
Tafflin v. Levitt,s° and Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly8i shed some
light on the question of whether the language of the TCPA divests federal
district courts of jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. However,
important differences between the language of the statutes and the nature of
state and federal question jurisdictions distinguish these precedents cited
by Gonell.
Gulf Offshore, Tafflin, and Yellow Freight concern federal statutes
providing for permissive federal jurisdiction.12 The question in these cases
is whether Congress ousted state courts from jurisdiction, given the silence
of the statute in this regard."' In each case, the Court found that there was
76. See id. at 1906-09. The Supreme Court presumes that state courts have jurisdiction
unless the language of the statute says otherwise. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473,478 (1981).
77. See Gonell, supra note 68, at 1934 (stating that Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) "teaches that even a universally shared expectation that
claims would be brought in one court cannot be an adequate substitute for a legislative
decision to defeat jurisdiction in another court").
78. See id. at 1908-09.
79. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
80. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
81. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
82. See id. at 823; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460; Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 482-83.
83. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 494 U.S. at 823; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460; Gulf
Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 482-83.
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concurrent jurisdiction, relying on the presumption that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims. 84 As Gonell noted, "state courts
are presumed to have jurisdiction over federal actions by virtue of their
status as courts of general jurisdiction of sovereign states in our federal
system."85 Due to this presumption, the "mere grant of jurisdiction to a
federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent
jurisdiction. 86 Gonell then made an analogy to these cases in concluding
that "federal courts have jurisdiction over federally created causes of action
• . . unless Congress clearly repeals that statute in whole or in part." 87
However, there is no symmetry between state and federal jurisdictions in
this regard, and thus the analogy is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court has held that it will affirm the existence of state
court jurisdiction over statutes providing for permissive federal court
jurisdiction "where it is not excluded by express provision, or by
incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular
case."88 This presumption is based almost entirely on state courts' status as
courts of general jurisdiction. As Justice Frankfurter noted:
[State courts may enforce federally created rights] for the same reason
that rights created by the British Parliament or by the Legislature of
Vermont could be enforced in the New York courts. Neither Congress
nor the British Parliament nor the Vermont Legislature has power to
confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts. But the [general]
jurisdiction conferred upon them by the only authority that has power
to create them and to confer jurisdiction upon them-namely the law-
making power of the State of New York-enables them to enforce
rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be.
89
The concept driving the presumption of state court jurisdiction over
federal claims is embodied in the last sentence of the excerpt above.
Because only state legislatures have the power to confer jurisdiction upon
their state courts, and these courts have been granted general jurisdiction
by their state legislatures, the federal courts must presume that state courts
are competent to hear federal cases unless Congress has specifically
decreed otherwise in individual statutes.
However, the same cannot be presumed of federal courts. Federal
courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, but instead are courts of
84. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 494 U.S. at 823; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 462; Gulf
Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 478.
85. Gonell, supra note 68, at 1908.
86. Id. at 1906 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479).
87. Id. at 1932-33.
88. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
89. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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limited jurisdiction.90 This means that federal courts may not exercise
jurisdiction over a claim unless Congress has specifically authorized them
to do so.91 As a result, the premise that supports the presumption of state
court jurisdiction over federal claims-that state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction-cannot be used to support a presumption of federal
district court jurisdiction over federal claims. This fundamental difference
in the nature of state and federal question jurisdiction accounts for the
asymmetry in the presumptions of state and federal question jurisdiction
exercised by these courts over federal claims.
Proponents of the analogy contend that section 1331 already gives
federal district courts jurisdiction over all claims brought to enforce rights
created by federal statute, thus effectively giving federal courts general
jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce federal law.92 However, the
general federal question jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law is
not the same general jurisdiction enjoyed by state courts. To appreciate the
differences between the two, one need look no further than the language
the Supreme Court has employed to describe the process of determining
whether federal question jurisdiction exists:
We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches
of [section] 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require
sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the
federal system. "If the history of the interpretation of judiciary
legislation teaches us anything, it teaches the duty to reject treating
such statutes as a wooden set of self-sufficient words .... The Act of
1875 is broadly phrased, but it has been continuously construed and
limited in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of
reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which
have emerged from the Act's function as a provision in the mosaic of
federal judiciary legislation." 93
This language suggests that the determination of the existence of federal
district court jurisdiction is a delicate process. The prudence required in
this process is very different from the nearly robotic application of the
sweeping grant of general jurisdiction enjoyed by state courts, which one
treatise describes as a "comprehensive residual subject matter jurisdiction
to hear all cases not exclusively allocated to courts of limited
90. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
91. See id.
92. See ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 521 & n.2 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) ("This observation [of the differences between state and federal courts with
respect to jurisdiction], while entirely accurate, is irrelevant to the issue before us....
[D]istrict courts have possessed general federal question jurisdiction since 1875.").
93. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (emphasis
added) (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
(1959)).
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jurisdiction. 94 For these reasons, any attempt to discern federal jurisdiction
over private TCPA claims by making an analogy to the presumption of
state court jurisdiction over federal claims is ill advised.
The second premise of the critics' approach-that Congress must
effectively repeal section 1331 in specific statutes if the district courts are
to be divested of junsdxctlon9 -is also flawed. First, the Court's language
above implicitly rejects the repeal approach to section 1331. The rigid
requirements96 for effectively repealing section 1331 to divest the district
courts of jurisdiction require that section 1331 be treated "as a wooden set
of self-sufficient words," which the Court in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co.9 7 abhors. The basis for an implied repeal must
ordinarily be evident from the language or operation of the statutes,98 as
opposed to relying on the legislative history of the statute for help in
discerning the purpose and policy underlying the statute. In this way, the
repeal approach to section 1331 is contrary to Romero because it requires
treating section 1331 as self-sufficient.
The repeal structure is also contrary to the approach taken by three
circuit courts that have addressed the issue. These courts read section 1331
as granting federal district courts jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal law unless district court jurisdiction is "precluded" 99 or
"preempted"' ' by another statute or doctrine of judicial administration. As
will be discussed in depth in Part V, this language suggests a much
different conception of the role of section 1331 in the federal jurisdiction
scheme. If section 1331 need only be preempted for a court other than the
district courts to have jurisdiction, then Congress need only show an intent
to assign jurisdiction elsewhere. 10'
In contrast, the repeal standard is much more exacting than the
preemption standard. Under the repeal standard, the statute (or other indicia
of congressional intent) may contain evidence of an intent contrary to
section 1331, but if the statutes can be reasonably construed not to conflict,
they must be left to coexist. 102 The repeal standard stands in stark contrast
94. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, § 23, at 101.
95. See Gonell, supra note 68, at 1908-09.
96. For a list of the requirements that a statute purporting to divest district courts of
jurisdiction under section 1331 must meet, see id. at 1909-10.
97. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
98. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,470 (1982).
99. See First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979).
100. See Connors v. Amax Coal Co., 858 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988); Public Util.
Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 1985).
101. See discussion infra Part V.
102. See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984).
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to the approach taken by three courts of appeals and undermines the
validity of the repeal structure in section 1331 analysis.
In sum, the two premises that the critics' approach to section 1331
rely upon are invalid. Because state and federal courts differ in the nature
of the jurisdiction they enjoy, the analogy the critics make to the
presumption of state court jurisdiction is inappropriate. In addition, the
critics' repeal framework flies in the face of existing circuit court
precedent, raising serious doubts as to its validity. In short, because two
indispensable premises of the critics' argument are flawed, the rest of the
approach languishes in a shadow of doubt.
V. THE PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK EXPLAINED AND APPLIED
The results reached by the federal courts of appeals regarding federal
jurisdiction over private actions brought to enforce the TCPA are correct:
the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over these cases. 0 3 The
criticisms leveled at the five circuit courts' opinions focus in part on the
courts' interpretations of the legislative history of the TCPA as a basis for
concluding that the TCPA divests the district courts of jurisdiction under
section 1331. 104 These criticisms are legitimate because the courts'
discussions of the legislative history are insufficiently developed.
However, the public policy expressed by Senator Hollings, the bill's
sponsor, coupled with a consideration of the possibility of and incentives
for defendant-initiated removal of private TCPA cases to federal courts
leads one to the inescapable conclusion that Congress did not grant federal
district courts jurisdiction over TCPA claims. In addition, the direct link
between the policy expressed in the legislative history and the unique
language of the statute supports that conclusion.
A. The Preemption Framework Is the Correct Approach
Gonell overstated the burden that the opinions of the circuit courts
must carry in order to show that the TCPA cases do not belong in federal
court. Gonell claimed that Congress, via express language or other indicia
of legislative intent, must effectively repeal section 1331 for every statute
that Congress does not want enforced in a federal district court.'05 Because
103. See Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc., v. Telecommunications Premium Serv., Ltd.,
156 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.
1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998); International
Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Comm., Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); Chair
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997).
104. See ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting); see generally Gonell,
supra note 68.
105. See Gonell, supra note 68, at 1934.
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repeals by implication are disfavored, Gonell concluded that "[n]one of the
circuit courts interpreting the TCPA analyzed the legislative history with
the rigor required to find an intent to repeal [section] 1331 by
implication."'' 06
The above approach misstates the relationship between section 1331
and the language of any statute conferring jurisdiction to courts other than
federal district courts. Three circuit courts have taken the position that
section 1331 should not be looked upon as being repealed by individual
statutes, but as being precluded'°7 or preemptedl°s by another statute. The
differences between the words "repealed" and "precluded" or "preempted"
are not mere wordplay, but instead reveal different conceptions of the role
that section 1331 plays in conferring federal jurisdiction. The word
"repealed" suggests that the language of the statute or the legislative
history must show an "unmistakable"' 9 intent on the part of Congress to
eliminate that which is already in existence, while the word "precluded"
suggests that the legislative history need only reveal a different intent of the
part of Congress sufficient to prevent federal jurisdiction from being
conferred. Because the circuit courts' opinions specifically concern federal
jurisdiction and have not been borrowed from general principles of
statutory precedence, the approach of those courts should control here. As
a result, the legislative history need only reveal a contrary intent on the part
of Congress to conclude that the TCPA divests federal courts of
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
B. The Role of the TCPA 's Legislative History in the Preemption
Framework
To determine congressional intent with respect to federal jurisdiction,
courts first look to the language of the statute.1 '0 As previously noted, the
TCPA does not mention federal jurisdiction. Instead, the TCPA only
provides that state courts may have jurisdiction.' The significance of this
omission is that the statutory language itself is of no immediate help in
determining whether Congress intended to give federal courts jurisdiction
over claims arising under the TCPA. If the statute expressly grants or
prohibits federal jurisdiction over these claims, then the provision disposes
106. Id. at 1925.
107. See First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979).
108. See Connors v. Amax Coal Co., 858 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988); Public Util.
Comm'r v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 1985).
109. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460 (1990); see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
110. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1998).
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (1994).
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of the issue. Otherwise, the statute's omission of federal jurisdiction brings
section 1331 into play. This requires the examination of other indicia of
congressional intent to determine if the TCPA divests federal courts of
jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
The legislative history reveals Congress's intent to make the
enforcement of the TCPA by private right of action relatively inexpensive
and simple. The legislative history expressly demonstrates that Congress
contemplated and even desired that these actions brought under the TCPAS112 T
be brought in state courts, particularly small claims court. However, this
history contains no mention of an intent to grant or prohibit the federal
district courts' jurisdiction over TCPA claims. At first glance, it may
appear that this consideration of the legislative history is of no help in
determining what exactly Congress intended. After all, it was the silence of
the statute itself concerning federal jurisdiction that made it necessary to
look other places to determine Congress's intent. How can a legislative
history that is equally silent on the issue of federal jurisdiction be of any
help?
The answer to the previous question lies in the reasons why Congress
wanted state courts to have jurisdiction over TCPA cases: the relative ease
with which these cases can be brought in state courts, as opposed to federal
courts. Recognizing that litigation in federal court is expensive and time-
consuming, Congress viewed state courts, particularly small claims courts,
as more hospitable venues for plaintiffs to bring actions to enforce the
TCPA. 3 In short, Congress wanted to make the enforcement of the TCPA
by private action cheap and easy for plaintiffs and viewed state courts as
the primary vehicle for enforcement.
VI. THE PossmLrrY OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURTS
CONSIDERED
If Congress's goal of cheap and easy litigation of TCPA claims is to
be realized, federal courts must be eliminated as a possible choice of
venue. The necessity of eliminating federal question jurisdiction over
TCPA claims becomes obvious once the possibility of defendants
removing these cases from state courts to federal courts is considered. The
removal of cases from state courts to federal courts is governed by federal
statute.'14 Essentially, "a defendant may remove a case from [state court to
federal court] only if the claim could have been brought in federal court"
112. See 137 CONG. REc. S30,821 (1991) (statement by Sen. Hollings).
113. Seeid.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
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originally. 15 In other words, defendants may unilaterally remove cases
brought to enforce federal statutes to federal courts if the statutes upon
which the cases are founded provide for concurrent jurisdiction.
When removal is a possibility, defendants with substantially more
assets in their litigation "war chests" than their plaintiff counterparts have
every incentive to remove the cases to federal courts. The prospect of
litigating in federal courts, accompanied by the costs of hiring attorneys
and possibly traveling to distant federal courthouses, may be enough to
frighten less-sophisticated plaintiffs into settling early or dropping the
action altogether. As a result, if Congress wishes to make the enforcement
of a statute cheap and easy, it must eliminate federal courts as a possible
venue for the action-not simply because it is expensive to commence
litigating in federal court, but because wealthy defendants have great
incentives to remove cases to federal court.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that Congress intended to confer
jurisdiction over cases brought under the TCPA to federal district courts.
The legislative history makes clear that Congress envisioned that the TCPA
could and would be enforced by plaintiffs of limited means against
defendants who are in the business of marketing products via
telecommunicative processes. These defendants, in turn, are likely to have
the means and the incentive to remove these cases to federal court. Few
plaintiff's attorneys will be willing to prepare a case for federal court when
the likely recovery for the client will be $500 per violation,11 6 as Senator
Hollings, the sponsor of the bill, recognized.' 1I As a result, if courts are to
remain true to their charge that they consider the provisions of the whole
law, its object, and its policy,1 8 then courts must interpret section 227(b)(3)
to confer exclusive jurisdiction of private TCPA cases to state courts.
Finally, the unique language of section 227(b)(3), coupled with the
unusual public policy expressed in the legislative history, suggests that
Congress intended to limit jurisdiction to state courts. As the cases
recognize,' 9 the language providing for jurisdiction over private TCPA
claims is unique. The sentiments expressed by the sponsor of the bill go
hand-in-hand with the interpretation that Congress intended to limit
jurisdiction to state courts. A lay person would likely look at the express
115. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (1994).
117. See 137 CONG. Rac. S30,821-22 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
118. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 455 (1993) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122
(1849)).
119. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 514 (3d Cir. 1998).
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language of the statute (coupled with the thoughts of the Senator Hollings)
and conclude that Congress intended for state courts to be the only venues
for private TCPA actions. Those with legal training should reach a similar
conclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The statutory language providing for state court jurisdiction over
private TCPA claims, absent any mention of federal jurisdiction, is unique.
The novelty of this language has caused the federal courts to scramble in
search for existing law to support their conclusions that the TCPA divests
federal district courts of jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.
The federal circuit courts' conclusions are correct. They base their
conclusions, in large part, on a more limited view of the role that section
1331 plays in conferring federal jurisdiction. Under this view, section 1331
grants jurisdiction to federal district courts unless another statute or
doctrine confers jurisdiction elsewhere. These courts read the express
mention of state courts (and only state courts) in section 227(b)(3) as
preempting section 1331 by conferring jurisdiction elsewhere. These courts
also rely on the express mention of federal courts elsewhere in the TCPA
and the Communications Act to conclude that Congress mentioned the
federal courts only in those instances where Congress intended to grant
jurisdiction to the federal courts. Also, these courts read the legislative
history to express a policy preference in favor of exclusive state court
jurisdiction.
The critics of the federal circuit courts' approach contend that the
circuit courts misapply section 1331 doctrine. The critics contend that
section 1331 grants federal courts the power to hear all cases arising under
federal law, unless the specific statute repeals section 1331 as it applies to
cases brought to enforce that statute. This complaint is undermined by its
conflicts with existing case law suggesting that the repeal structure does
not apply to section 1331 analysis. Also, the critics' application of section
1331 to the TCPA requires that there be symmetry between the
presumptions of state court jurisdiction and federal court jurisdiction that
simply has no basis in law or reason.
Finally, while the federal circuit courts reached the correct result,
these courts overlooked an important justification for that result. Given the
policy preference demonstrated in the legislative history of the TCPA for
the cheap and easy enforcement of the TCPA by private action, state courts
must be the only venues available for private TCPA claims. Even if
plaintiffs commence their actions in state court, defendants will have every
incentive to remove the cases to federal court due to the increased burden
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that federal court litigation will impose on plaintiffs. As a result, federal
courts must be stripped of jurisdiction over private TCPA claims if
Congress is to realize its goal of making the enforcement of the TCPA
cheap and easy. This provides another justification for the federal circuit
courts' conclusions that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over
private TCPA claims.
